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This paper examines the protracted nature of displacement in the Iraqi context and places
emphasis on the need for a social integration policy to bridge the deep cleavages of Iraqi soci-
ety. Methodologically, the paper utilizes qualitative data by conducting focus-group discus-
sions with IDPs and semi-structured individual interviews in KRI. In terms of return
possibilities, while return in many ways is perceived to be not practical and to involve future
risks, research findings show that a community-based distinction needs to be made between
IDPs from minority backgrounds and IDPs who belong to demographic majorities in the
homeland locations. A second distinction is a geographic and political one as findings indicate
that IDPs who take refuge in KRI, though remain largely dissatisfied with displacement condi-
tions, are willing to stay in KRI longer in the hope of further security and reconstruction pro-
cess in the violence-affected areas. With respect to social integration policy, the paper outlines
institutional, political and cultural explanations for a virtually absolute absence of social inte-
gration policy on national and regional levels. The paper suggests that the proposed social
integration policy can capitalize practical implications of Social Contact Theory (SCT) in
enhancing the integration of IDPs in the host communities.
INTRODUCTION
The return of internally displaced persons (IDPs)1 to their areas of origin (AoO) often encounters
complicated dynamics, particularly for IDPs who flee armed conflict and violence. Stefanovic and
Loizides (2011) classify the determinants of intention to return into four factors: security, economic,
education and social capital. Before offering a brief description for each, it is worth noting that
these factors can exert contradictory effects of push-and-pull factors in displacement and in AoO;
in other words, IDPs tend to make calculations for the above-mentioned factors both in the dis-
placement settings and in the AoO. Any decision to return or stay is, eventually, the outcome of
such comprehensive calculations.
The security thesis places emphasis on the stabilization of security conditions as a precondition
of return. A report by the Return Working Group (Iraq) (RWG, 2018) states that while thinking of
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return, safety and security in the AoO has been one of the most discussed topics for IDPs with
their family and relative stayers in AoO. Another report by IOM (February 2019) shows that “a
better safety in the location of displacement” has been the main driver for (91%) of the IDPs inter-
viewed to stay displaced. The same report reveals that improvement in security conditions was
essential for roughly 60 per cent of IDPs who returned to AoO. The economic thesis, moreover,
points to the indicators of economic prosperity, development and job opportunities to stress that the
lack of economic opportunities in AoO, even in the context of improved security conditions, can
prevent IDPs from return. Similar to concerns about safety and security, “livelihood opportunities
and the status of housing” in AoO has been one of the central issues for IDPs thinking of return in
Iraq (RWG, 2018). In the same vein, research in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Tuathail and O’Loughlin,
2009) demonstrates that some families ended up in displacement with better economic conditions
and are reluctant to “gamble on return areas where important sources of local employment were in
the hands of wartime profiteers and political figures”. Interestingly, Metivier, Stefanovic and Loi-
zides (2018) refer to the second displacement of many returnees who faced ethnic discrimination in
the local public institutions after return, which in consequence forced them to leave again, this time
for economic reasons. Meanwhile, advocates of the education thesis posit that the restoration of
education opportunities (e.g. reopening of schools and universities) and their accessibility in the
host community, especially for families with school-age children, is essential for any possible
return/ stay (Tuathail and O’Loughlin, 2009; IOM, 2019). Finally, the social capital thesis stresses
on the significance of IDP networks and community associations in their impact on the intentions
to return. In this regard, the community effort hypothesis suggests that victims of ethnic cleansing
when are able to endure traditional ties with their fellows in AoO are more likely to consider joint
return than those who managed to establish links with residents from the host communities (Ste-
fanovic and Loizides, 2011). Research on ethnic economic migrants (Pierre, Martinovic and
Vroome, 2015) points to similar outcomes: the research shows that migrants who achieved higher
degrees of social and cultural integration (establishing contacts with local people and developing
language proficiency) are more inclined to stay than to return. In the framework of social capital
thesis, attention has also been paid to the contribution of IDP and refugee associations to advocate
for pro-return policies and also to encourage collective return of displaced communities (Stefanovic
and Loizides, 2011; Metivier, Stefanovic and Loizides, 2018). It is worth mentioning that the home
thesis, with its focus on the IDP communities’ nostalgic aspirations to restore pre-displacement
communal life and social cohesion after return, can best fit within the social capital thesis.
Nevertheless, research on return has elucidated a range of other nuances, which make return fur-
ther complicated. To begin with, research on Iraq and elsewhere (Tuathail and O’Loughlin, 2009;
Adelman and Barkan, 2011; PAX for Peace, 2015; Metivier, Stefanovic and Loizides, 2018; Ozal-
tin, Shakir and Loizides, 2019; IOM, 2019) has pointed to the gap of return between ethnic minor-
ity and ethnic majority groups with the former to have demonstrated feeble inclination to return.
Moreover, research (Metivier, Stefanovic and Loizides, 2018) has also referred to generational dif-
ferences in return intensions: IDPs who are born or grown up in the displaced setting and, in con-
sequence, have less memory and attachment to the original home occasionally demonstrated less
enthusiasm about return. Furthermore, research (Ozaltin, Shakir and Loizides, 2019; IOM, 2019)
demonstrates that more educated IDPs not only are less inclined to return, but also are more enthu-
siastic to migrate to other countries. It is also suggested (Stefanovic and Loizides, 2011; Metivier,
Stefanovic and Loizides, 2018; RWG, 2018; IOM February 2019) that return in many cases is a
family and even a community decision. Safety in Numbers is an expression used to capture the
preference of IDPs, especially from minority backgrounds, to return collectively as opposed to indi-
vidual or family return, which may make them easy targets of future violence.
By focusing on IDPs displaced to Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), this research examines the
potential return of IDPs to AoO. The paper suggests that in spite of retaking areas that had been
controlled by Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and a significant plunge of sectarian violence
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(not necessarily discrimination), return to AoO, for wide sections of IDPs, is not a near possibility.
This is mainly applicable to IDPs who belong to minority groups in Nineveh and other gover-
norates of Iraq. In this framework, a range of pull-and-push factors, both in the displacement and
in the AoO, are studied.
As return becomes challenging, social integration of IDPs in the host communities comes to the
fore. Prior to the way social integration of IDPs in KRI is examined, a brief conception of social
integration is presented. Rutter (2015) offers a review of the multitude approaches through which
social integration is defined: a Right-based approach, which defines social integration in terms of
civil, political and social rights; Outcome-based approach, which places emphasis on a range of
outcome and indicators such as employment rates, educational attainment and political participation
to measure social integration; Contact-based approach, which stresses the significance of social
contacts between refugees/displaced people with long-settled residents of the host communities; and
finally, Participation-based approach, which insists on social inclusion and active participation in
labour force, workplace, civil society, political participation and so forth. Ager and Strang (2004
cited in Rutter, 2015) try to provide an inclusive definition by suggesting that social integration is
a combination of a set of attributes/ facilitators (such as language proficiency, rights and responsi-
bilities and social capital) and outcomes/integration markers (for instance educational attainment,
and market-related and political indicators). Nonetheless, the social integration of IDPs is defined
in a more specified way. The Framework for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons
(cited in IOM, 2019) states “IDPs achieve local integration (or sustainable return or relocation)
when they: (i) no longer have specific assistance and protection needs and vulnerabilities that are
directly linked to their displacement and (ii) enjoy their human rights without discrimination on
account of their displacement”.
This research is not an attempt to measure social integration of IDPs. Rather, it is an effort to
present an argument about the lack of social integration policy in KRI and Iraq. The research goes
further to advocate for the utilization of Social Contact Theory (SCT) in designing a policy for
social integration. SCT has long suggested that cross-community interactions, under right condi-
tions, can help to revise and deconstruct existing negative stereotypes and reduce levels of preju-
dice and discrimination (see, e.g., Allport, 1979; Bratt, 2002; Pettigrew, 2006; Pettigrew et al.,
2011). Among the first advocates of SCT, Gordon Allport (1979, pp. 262-263) posits that frequent
and meaningful contacts, as opposed to sporadic and casual contacts, between people of equal sta-
tus can bring about positive changes in inter-community relations. Recent research (Jones and Rut-
land, 2018) has found that different forms of contact (direct, extended and imagined contact)
reduced the prejudice of youth towards immigrants. Likewise, Tropp and Okamoto (2018) while
defining social integration as a relational process suggest that frequency and the quality of contacts
(friendliness versus discrimination) determine social integration of immigrants. In the same vein,
Cheung and Phillimore (2014) suggest that length of residency and language competency broaden
one’s social networks and facilitate integration of refugees in the labour market. Research has also
examined barriers of social contact: Hebbani, Colic-Peisker and Mackinnon (2018) study the impact
of cultural differences and language barriers for the social integration of refugees in Greater Bris-
bane. Similarly, Muller and Smets (2009) show how culturally unrealized expectations of Iraqi
refugees in the Netherlands for close neighbourhood-based contacts disappointed Iraqi refugees and
weakened their effort to establish contacts with native Dutch residents.
For Kurds and other Iraqi communities, displacement, along with its unwelcome consequences,
offers unprecedented opportunities for interaction. The facts that the main cities of the KRI tended
to be overwhelmingly ethnically homogeneous and the region remained outside the control of Iraqi
government from 1991 onwards mean that chances for cross-communal interactions have been
scarce. In the main urban centres, large-scale displacements have transformed some of the interac-
tion spaces (especially residential neighbourhoods) and made them increasingly heterogeneous.
Consequently, the new demographic realities, particularly in more urban settings, offer
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opportunities for interventions that can create an environment to bridge communities that have been
displaced.
CONTEXT: KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ
KRI is located to the North and North East of Iraq. It consists of the four governorates of Erbil,
Sulaimani, Dahuk and Halabja with an area of 40643 Km2. (Kurdistan Region Government Web-
site, 2018). Latest updates (Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 2018, p. 14) estimate
the population of the region to have reached 5,122,747 individuals in 2014. The overwhelming
majority of the population are Kurds who have, alongside Arabs, Christians, Sabean Mandaeans,
Turkmens, Yazidis, Kakais and Jews, populated the area for a long history. Due to the demo-
graphic restructuring policies of successive Iraqi governments, inaccuracy of population censuses
and general politicization of ethnicity, entirely reliable figures about the population size of each
community are hard to find (see, e.g., Ismail, 2005; Anderson and Stansfield, 2009; Ismail, 2011;
Bengio, 2014; Ozaltin, Shakir and Loizides, 2019).
KRI enjoyed a de facto autonomous situation since 1991, and, since 2005, it is recognized by
Iraqi constitution as a self-governing region within the boundaries of Iraqi federal state (Iraqi Con-
stitution 2005, Article 117-first, available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_
2005.pdf?lang=en). As a result of disagreements between KRI and Iraqi government, the Iraqi
permanent constitution of 2005 failed to define the geographic boundaries of KRI. The “Internally
Disputed Territories” (see Map KRI and IDTs in Iraq) thus defined by Iraqi Constitution include
fifteen districts in the governorates of Nineveh, Kirkuk, Saladin, Erbil, and Diyala and it is a
swathe of land that begins from Sinjar to the Northwest of Iraq and extends to Khanaqin and Man-
dali in the Northeast (Riordan, 2016, p. 2).
Since the 2003 war, KRI, unlike other parts of Iraq, has proven to be significantly safer area and
managed to achieve high records of economic development2. Economically, in spite of widespread
corruption and public grievances over inequalities (see Watts, 2016), the region witnessed an
unprecedented investment boom. The KRG’s Board of Investment Factsheet points to an invest-
ment of USD 22bn from 2006 to mid-2012. By 2012, foreign direct investment made up 15 per
cent of the total investment (KRG Board of Investment, 2012). The rapid rise of investment rates
in the region can be explained, on the one hand, by the political and security stability of the region
Map: KRI and IDTs in Iraq.
Source: glohttps://www.google.com
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and, on the other hand, by the controversial Law of Investment (Law for Investment in Kurdistan
Region No.4, 2006, available at: http://www.kurdistan-parliament.org/Default.aspx?page=byyea
r&c=LDD-Yasa&id=2006).
DISPLACEMENT IN IRAQ (2003-2019): AN OVERVIEW
Massive population displacements, systematic or as a consequence of civic unrest, have been a
common collective experience in the last fifty years of Iraqi history. A well-documented policy of
demographic engineering, with the aim of changing the demographic composition of ethnically
diverse and economically strategic areas, has been implemented in many parts of the country (see,
e.g., Ismail, 2005; Ismail, 2011; Anderson and Stansfield, 2009; Bengio, 2014; PAX for Peace,
2015, Ozaltin, Shakir and Loizides, 2019). The second part of displacement, which is the subject
of this paper, in contrast to the systematic demographic change, is, for the most part, a consequence
of the collapse of state control and widespread sectarian violence and organized crime, which swept
the country in the aftermath of the 2003 war.
Although by 2006 an estimated 250,000 Iraqis had already been displaced, there is an agreement
that the attack on Al-Askari Shrine, one of the holiest Shi’a shrines in Samarra in February 2006,
constituted the spark for sectarian violence in Iraq. Between 2006 and 2008 apart from 1.8 million
Iraqis who took refuge in neighbouring countries, 1.6 million Iraqi were displaced internally (Inter-
national Organization of Migration (IOM) 2014. p. 15 also see Marfleet, 2011, p. 280).
A relatively stable era 2008-2012 was followed by a gradual deterioration of situations in pre-
dominantly Sunni Arab governorates (Anbar, Nineveh, Diyala and Saladin). The Iraqi government’s
violent reaction to sit-in demands in those governorates triggered another wave of displacement,
though not of a large scale. IOM (2014, p. 16) reports that 9,991 persons were displaced in 2013.
The invasion of predominantly Sunni Arab governorates in 2014 by ISIL marks the beginning of
massive waves of displacement. In the span of four months (June to September 2014), 1,901,370
(IOM, 2015) persons were displaced, of which number 836,670 IDPs were from Mosul alone
(IOM, 2014). In spite of the return of substantial segments of IDPs in 2017-2018, the latest avail-
able figure of 2018 estimates the number of Iraqi IDPs to reach 1.8 million persons (DTM 2018
cited in Ozaltin, Shakir and Loizides, 2019).
Due to their stable security conditions, relative economic prosperity and geographic adjacency to
predominantly Sunni Arab governorates, the four governorates of KRI provided safe havens for large
number of IDPs. KRI hosted 810,000 Iraqi IDPs who fled sectarian violence between 2003 and
2010, and it received another 1.8 million IDPS in the aftermath of the ISIL attack (Ministry of Inte-
rior – KRG, 2017). Although after retaking Nineveh and other majority Sunni Arab governorates
from ISIL, considerable sections of IDPs began moving to their AoO, figures of Joint Crisis Coordi-
nation Centre, KRG (JCCC), point to the existence of 763,277 registered IDPs in KRI in June 2019.
To conclude this section, reference to two facts is essential: first, a peculiar feature of displace-
ment in Iraq is that it has not been confined to one specific area. In fact, as Marfleet (2011, p. 280)
observes, each governorate (excluding governorates of KRI) of Iraq has produced and received
IDPs. The overarching displacement trend has been one of movement of IDPs to communities
whose religious and ethnic identity is consistent with that of the majority of the population in host
communities (Ibid, p. 280). In this sense, the internal displacement in Iraq strengthened further the
physical and social segregation of society along ethnic and religious lines. Internal displacement
also influenced the composition of neighbourhoods in multi-ethnic and religious urban settings. In
this regard, while in Baghdad, historically most of the neighbourhoods were ethnically mixed and,
according to Ala Hussain Al-Qazzaz (cited in Damluji, 2010, p. 76), religion and sect never had an
impact on one’s place of residence, in post-2006, sectarian violence and organized crime enforced
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a clear-cut geographical segregation along ethnic lines: interestingly by early 2007, an estimate of
5.25 of Baghdad’s total population of the then 7 million resided in homogeneous neighbourhoods
(Damluji, 2010, p. 78). A similar trend was the case in many other historically mixed cities of Iraq:
in Kirkuk, for example, Kurds mostly moved to the northern neighbourhoods and Arabs to the
southern neighbourhoods of the city, and in Mosul, Sunni Arabs remained on the western side of
Tigris and Kurds and other minorities concentrated on the eastern side (Rydgren and Sofi, 2011;
PAX for Peace, 2015). Adelman and Barkan (2011) conclude:
Iraqi society has been fractured along ethnic and religious lines, but these divisions now define not
only the predominant political structure, but also the geographical division of the population into
virtually exclusive zones of Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurds, with an almost total ethnic cleansing of other
minorities.
Second, a significant fact about displacement in Iraq is the disproportionate representation of eth-
nic and religious minorities (ERMs) in the overall displaced population (The Centre of International
Governance Innovation, 2009, p.3). Although ERMs make up roughly 5 per cent of the country’s
population, 20 per cent of the overall Iraqi IDPs are from ERM backgrounds. Intimidation and
actual violence against members of ERMs has been a country-wide phenomenon. According to the
Minority Rights Group International Report, 90 per cent of Chaldo-Assyrians, 76 per cent of Yazi-
dis, 75 per cent of Shabaks and 85 per cent of Turkmen have received threats motivated by ethnic
or religious animosity, including pressure to assimilate to dominant local religious norms and/or to
give pledges of support for different militia groups (cited in Marfleet, 2011 also PAX for Peace,
2015). The report by the Centre for International Governance Innovation points to the displacement
of 80 per cent of Mandaeans and 60 per cent of Christians. Of 1,200 Christian families in Basra in
2003, only a few managed to stay. Nearly 75 per cent of Christians have fled Baghdad, many tak-
ing refuge in northern governorates. A report shows that only 10 per cent of Christians who used
to reside in Iraq in 1991 remained in the country. The same reports states that half of Iraqi asylum
seekers in Europe are Iraqi Christians (Adelman, 2015, p.174). This has led some to suggest that
Iraq is moving towards a minority-free nation. It is worth noting that 60 per cent of IDPs in KRI
are from ERM backgrounds (JCCC, 2019).
METHODOLOGY
This research makes use of qualitative data gathered by the author in 2015, 2017 and 2018 as part
of separate research projects on a) the return of IDPs to Nineveh (for which the author worked as
research consultant to PAX for Peace); b) political participation of ERMs in Nineveh after ISIL;
and c) Kurdish inhabitants’ attitude in Erbil towards Iraqi Arab IDPs in KRI. The data collection in
March 2015 included focus-group discussions with IDPs from minority backgrounds in IDP camps
in the governorates of Erbil and Dahuk in KRI and representatives of those communities in the
Iraqi Parliament and Provincial Council of Nineveh. Overall, alongside 18 interviews with key
informants, more than 300 persons participated in the focus-group discussions that were carried out
in IDP camps. The 2017 data collection on political participation of ERMs was confined to political
party leaders and members of Iraqi Parliament representing minorities in Nineveh. In this project,
ten people were interviewed. The third project on the attitude of Kurdish inhabitants in Erbil city
towards Iraqi Arab IDPs was a survey in which 224 persons participated. In addition, the paper
uses a number of pilot interviews, which were carried out in the second half of 2018 with
midlevel policy implementers in the Ministry of Interior, KRG. The research also utilized sec-
ondary data analysis by examining figures and recent reports published on displacement in Iraq.
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Yet, future research projects need to overcome some of the limitations of this paper by including
a thorough examination of other examples of displacement and social integration policies in differ-
ent contexts. Adding a comparative aspect to the research in this area is likely to be helpful in
designing social integration policies in KRI. Moreover, future research is encouraged to reach out
to IDPs in non-camp settings as it allows examining indicators of social integration in a context
where displacement took long enough for the IDPs and host communities to interact and to estab-
lish durable social contacts.
Finally, it is worth noting that data collection, especially with the first wave of focus-group dis-
cussions, encountered significant difficulties. First, IDPs interviewed, mostly from Nineveh, spoke
variations of informal Arabic language and other IDPs from ERM backgrounds sometimes spoke
completely different languages. Although the author received essential support from a local research
assistant, minor communication issues were not entirely overcome. Second, and more importantly,
it was the fact that IDPs in the camp setting, by the time of the data collection for this project, had
already been overwhelmed by other research projects and need assessment missions conducted by
governmental and non-governmental agencies. The impacts of this were twofold: on the one hand,
some IDP had become tired, and hostile to, researchers approaching them having almost the same
set of questions to ask; and on the other hand, the humanitarian needs of IDPs were so overriding
to discourage them to talk about seemingly less pressing cultural or political issues. As interviewees
placed (understandably) central emphasis on basic needs of shelter, water and food, frequent diver-
sions of the communication would occur during the course of interviews. In many instances, inter-
viewees would expect/ hope to receive immediate assistance and would hope this project to be
instrumental in receiving swift humanitarian services.
RETURN: THE POSSIBILITY AND COMMUNITY VARIATIONS
For many IDPs, especially for IDPs from ERM backgrounds, return is not the most desired option
(PAX for Peace, 2015; MERI, 2017a; IOM, 2019). Research shows (MERI, 2017a) that displace-
ment for a considerable numbers of IDPs is a pre-step for a cross-border migration. About 45 per
cent of IDP household surveyed in Middle East Research Institute (MERI)’s report (Ibid) have
wished or even developed concrete plans to leave the country altogether. IOM (Feb. 2019) report
indicates that 39 per cent of Christian IDPs and 25 per cent of Yazidi IDPs plan to migrate abroad.
Nevertheless, sizeable numbers of IDPs are willing/ hopping/ planning to return to their original
homelands inside Iraq. According to UNHCR (cited in Minority Rights Group International, 2016,
p. 30), 42 per cent of Iraqi IDPs in southern and central parts of Iraq intend to return and 35 per
cent are waiting to make a decision on the matter. The figures drop for IDPs in the northern gover-
norates of KRI as only 22 per cent of IDPs reported the intention to return to their original loca-
tions. Motivations for return, that is pushing factors in the host community, (PAX for Peace, 2015;
Minority Rights Group International, 2016; MERI, 2017a) revolve around, but are not limited to,
poor living conditions in the camp and other displacement settings3, lack of services and job oppor-
tunities, discrimination, inability to cope with host communities due to language or cultural barriers,
security restrictions on the movement of IDPs, emotional attachment to the homeland and family
reunification. In spite of return, returnees have not always found post-return environment satisfying:
In fact, IOM (February 2019) survey on returnees demonstrates that 87 per cent of returnees sur-
veyed are not satisfied: three areas of concern are services, security and economic opportunities.
To understand motivations for reluctance to return, one has to take into account that IDPs do not
constitute a homogeneous category. In fact, a distinction has to be made between IDPs on two
important grounds, IDPs from minority backgrounds vs. IDPs from majority backgrounds, and a
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second distinction between locations of displacement (central and south locations vs. northern loca-
tions).
Consistent with other literature (Tuathail and O’Loughlin, 2009; Adelman and Barkan, 2011;
Metivier, Stefanovic and Loizides, 2018; Ozaltin, Shakir and Loizides, 2019) that asserts that return
to a location where one’s ethnic community constitutes the demographic majority is perceived to
be safer and therefore more desired, MERI’s (2017a, p. 30) data show that return has been a more
attractive option for Shi’a Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens than to ethnic and religious
minorities such as Christians, Sunni Shabaks, Yazidis or Kakais. This finding has been confirmed
by IOM’s survey (February 2019), which demonstrates that nearly all Shi’a Shabaks and Shi’a
Turkmen (belonging to majority Shi’a communities) are planning to stay in their areas of return.
Correspondently, IOM’s survey (Ibid) shows that although ERMs make up 22 per cent of Iraqi
IDPs, they barely constitute 2.7 per cent of returnees.
The decision to return for minorities is much more complicated than it is for members of major-
ity groups: the wide-scale violence against ERMs amid a situation of lawlessness in many parts of
Iraq after the 2003 war has made minorities deeply uncertain about their future in Iraq. Our focus-
group discussions with IDPs from minority backgrounds revealed numerous examples of violence
and discriminatory practices against minorities. As large sections of IDPs from ERM backgrounds
headed abroad, Minority Rights Groups International (2016) correctly concluded that Iraqi “minori-
ties are on the verge of disappearance”. IDPs from minority backgrounds, across interviewees, were
deeply sceptical not only about the capacity of Iraqi government but also about its intention and
honesty to protect them upon any future return. A participant in a focus-group discussion said:
Iraqi government used whatever force it had and used coalition forces with all of its advanced com-
bat machinery to protect Shi’a population of Amirli4. . .but what did they do to protect Yazidis?
We have been under siege of Da’esh for six months in Sinjar Mountains. . .they never came to
help.
Recognizing the possibilities of future violence against minorities after any possible return, there
is a strong call by ethnic and religious minorities, grassroots and elite alike that any return has to
be guaranteed by international protection. Yazidi and Christian participants would regularly repeat
that “we only return when there is international protection” and that “we will not return with this
government. . .[and] that this government sells us at the cost of one dinar”. The calls, in some
instances, go further to include new institutional arrangements that can protect minorities and guar-
antee their autonomy in areas where they constitute a demographic majority. This applies mainly to
Nineveh plain, which is a home for Christian, Yazidi, Turkmen, Shabaks and Kakais. In this frame-
work, proposals such as the creation of an autonomous region in Nineveh Plain, after the KRI
model, or at least creation of a new governorate in the area have been on the table (PAX for Peace,
2015; Khedir, 2017a; MERI, 2017b). Even in certain instances, some IDPs advocated integration
of their areas into KRI. Hence, when it comes to minorities, return becomes a political issue and
exceeds the conventional focus on physical reconstruction and individual concerns associated with
availability of basic services or job opportunities.
Another distinction for IDP communities is the difference in the locations of displacement: in this
regard, IDPs who took refuge in KRI are less likely to take immediate decisions about return. In
spite of the entry restrictions and restrictions over movement that had been introduced by KRG
(now relaxed) and even some forms of social, cultural and economic discriminations towards IDPs
particularly IDPs from Arab backgrounds (Interview with IDPs from Arab backgrounds in KRI),
largely due to the absence of any security risks, IDPs interviewed are happy to stay longer in KRI
and wait to take a more informed decision about staying, returning or migrating to other countries.
Participants in focus-group discussions very frequently emphasized that they, at least, feel safe in
KRI. Other interviewees in a different research project had said, “Here [in Kurdistan] we feel like
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we live in another country”. Furthermore, some IDPs interviewed stated that “here in Kurdistan we
are treated equally. . .nobody tells you are Turkmen, Shabak, or Christian”. Apparently, for many
IDPs, choosing to stay in KR reflects mainly the ability of the KRG to maintain stability. There-
fore, in return for safety, they are willing to compromise on the basic needs of food, clean water,
shelter, education and job opportunities. It should also be noted that even before 2014, events that
triggered massive displacement from Nineveh, KRI, especially the two adjacent governorates of
Erbil and Dahuk, were significant providers of economic opportunities for residents of Nineveh
plain.
As security, economic and reconstruction of the violence-affected areas did not improve, there
has been a new sporadic movement of re-displacement for IDPs who had returned to their original
locations in the areas retaken from ISIL in 2017. Hoshang Mohammed, KRG’s JCCC director, sta-
ted that 11,000 persons were re-displaced from Mosul in the first eight months of 2018 (Rudaw
Media Network 2018, available at http://www.rudaw.net/sorani/kurdistan/130820188). The instabil-
ity of newly retaken areas, fears associated with retaliations and discriminations and stability and
economic opportunities in KRI have been among the most important explanatory factors for the
new re-displacements. Overall, for substantial portions of IDP communities, return is not an imme-
diate option, re-displacement, despite the fact that ISIL has been almost completely driven out of
Iraqi territories, for a variety of reasons, remains a possibility. This protracted nature of displace-
ment brings to the fore the necessity of a social integration policy.
SOCIAL INTEGRATION: THE ABSENCE OF A POLICY
MERI’s report (2017a) suggests that displacement in Iraq should be perceived as a chronic issue,
not a temporal or a humanitarian matter. This understanding is relevant given that the Iraqi context
is marked by the fragility of political process and the ineffectiveness of state apparatuses in main-
taining peace and stability. The possibilities remain for further displacements and re-displacements
after return. One of the implications for the protracted nature of displacement is that social integra-
tion policies need to be developed at national and regional levels.
In addition, even though it is not plausible to straightforwardly portray Iraqi society as a totally
sectarian society, one cannot deny the fact that the manifestations of violent sectarianism grew
rapidly and that many forms of violence, including forced displacement, are practised to serve sec-
tarian agendas (see, e.g., Inglehart, Moaddel and Tessler, 2006; Damluji, 2010; Rydgren and Sofi,
2011; Haddad, 2011; Adelman and Barkan, 2011; Khedir, 2013). Research has shown that Iraqi
society has moved towards social and physical segregations and that level of inter-community trust
and tolerance has declined significantly. Social integration policies, therefore, should now be at the
heart of any debate about the future of the country. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi IDPs, many
from Arab and ERM backgrounds, have settled in KRI and lack the tools and support to integrate
in the Kurdish communities. Consequently, IDPs remained physically and socially isolated, in the
case of IDPs in the refugee camps, and socially isolated in the case of IDPs who live in Kurdish
urban neighbourhoods. In this context, IDPs pointed out that not speaking Kurdish language consti-
tutes a real barrier for them to interact with Kurds (MERI 2017a). In another survey, Khedir
(2017b) found that for the host community too, language proved to be a momentous barrier and
that Kurds who speak Arabic were more likely to engage in social contact with Iraqi Arab IDPs.
Yet, it is safe to argue that social integration of IDPs is by no means a government policy/ prior-
ity. This applies to Iraqi national and Kurdistan governments. Institutionally, on the national level,
the government of Iraq’s Ministry of Migration and Displaced (MMD) has not been tasked with
any forms of social integration-related mandates (see Law of Ministry of Migration and Displaced
numbered 21 for the year, 2009). The law that specifically identifies multitude categories of
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displaced Iraqis refers very vaguely to providing “necessary services” to them. In few instances,
the law merely mentions “immediate and urgent needs” without tackling the long-term needs of
IDPs. In Kurdistan Region, the JCCC, formed by KRG, resembles the Iraqi MMD in the sense that
its scope of activities is confined to engage in coordination with local, national and international
actors in providing humanitarian needs for the IDPs in the region. In consequence, interviewees
from ministerial level in KRG recognized the complexity of displacement issue and called for a
more organized, coordinated (engagement with the UN and Iraqi government) and inclusive
approach to the issue: an Interviewee stated:
The government [KRG] on its own cannot deal with IDPs. . .like Baghdad, it should have had a
ministry for displacement. . .displacement is a complicated issue and has many cultural, economic
and demographic aspects.
Another interviewee (shared by other interviewees) pointed to the necessity of a broader
approach to IDPs. He stated:
The Government need not to look at IDPs through security lenses. . .it is time for the attention to
be paid to educational, economic and cultural needs of displaced individuals.
A more significant impediment, however, is the political sensitivities that surround displacement.
In KRI, reflecting a history of state-sponsored demographic changes, there are common fears that
displacement of massive numbers of Iraqi Arab IDPs may result in another wave of demographic
change in the future (Interview with key informants). Thus, both at the elite and grassroots levels,
there is a conviction that the displacement of Arab IDPs must not be allowed to prolong. Further-
more, what reinforces pro-return of IDPs is security concerns resulted from potential involvement
of some IDPs or their families and relatives in exterimist groups: an interviewee said:
A substantial section of Sunni Arab IDPs have already taken part in terrorist activities of Da’esh or
they say they are accused by Shi’a Arabs as collaborators of Da’esh. . .Shi’as do that to drive us
out from our homes.
Nevertheless, none of interviewees from KRG ministry of Interior called for forced return of
IDPs, even with IDPs who constitute stronger potential security threat. An Interviewee said “IDPs
who do not pose a security concern should be allowed to stay, and others must be encouraged to
return”. Interviewees suggested that KRG and Iraqi government must do their best to return IDPs
as fast as possible. This tendency has not been challenged by the recognition that displacement has
had some positive impacts on the economy of Kurdish society and it has enhanced community rela-
tions (Interviews with Key informants and Khedir, 2017b). Apparently, long-term political concerns
related to demographic changes and, to lesser extent, economic concerns associated with the burden
created by displacement on KRG and the market have detrimentally shaped mass attitudes towards
displacement. Therefore, in the host environment, a pro-return preference seems to be ominously
pervasive.
For different reasons, other Iraqi communities have taken similar positions: Sunni Arab elites,
whose areas have been the major producers of IDPs in the aftermath of ISIL’s capture of Mosul
and other predominantly Arab Sunni governorates, are worried that displacement of hundreds of
thousands of Sunni Arabs will negatively harm their election constituencies. Sunni Arab elites have
feared that the displacement of massive number of their supporters to KRI and other Iraqi cities
would lead to a decline in the true presence of Sunni Arab voice in the Iraqi Parliament. Although
not stated publicly, there are also common reservations that the longer Arab IDPs stay in KRI; Kur-
dish authorities will have a stronger chance to patronize them. It is argued that in displacement set-
tings, either as a result of fear or as a consequence of providing privileges (stick and carrot), IDPs
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will not have full freedom to elect their “authentic” representatives. Having many IDPs in KRI and
that they cast their vote in the region has been suggested to enable Kurdish authorities to influence
the displaced persons’ vote. In the period leading up to the May 2018 parliamentary elections,
Sunni Arab elites were among the loudest advocates for the postponement of elections. They
demanded for elections to take place following the return of IDPs. Additionally, minority groups’
elites, on their part, have persistently raised concerns about the ultimate existence of minorities in
the country resulting from massive outward migrations. Hence, it is not only the Kurds (the host
community and elites) who have taken pro-return attitudes, but rather it is a preference shared by
other communities and political elites, albeit for different reasons. Associated with that, there is a
belief that displacement is method to gain political ends: an interviewee while advocated for return
of IDPs considered displacement as a political method by Shi’a elites to purge Sunni Arabs and to
create a strong Shi’astan (land of Shi’a) in Iraq, a move a according to him, must be resisted by
returning the Sunni Arabs back to their areas of origin. He said:
nothing is left to be called Iraq. . .we have a Shi’astan and Kurdistan Region. . .the staying of IDPs
in Kurdistan not only does not relax the financial burden of KRG, it facilitates the plan of creation
of a tyrannical Shi’a state which will be a threat to Kurdistan region and other components in the
country.
In spite of the relevance of political and security-related concerns, the absence of a social integra-
tion policy has other roots: there is an obvious lack of a policy concept and tradition of social inte-
gration in Iraq. What makes this line of argument robust is that in the last three decades, there
have been other communities who were in need of social integration services but never received
them in any significant way. Kurdish refugees who returned from Western countries or those who
returned from neighbouring countries (mainly Iran) are a case in point. Interestingly, some policies
of KRG in relation to Kurdish returnees from the Western countries have discouraged their social
integration. For instance, the first school to instruct children of returnee families was set up by Kur-
distan Save the Children in October 2004 (Romano, n.d). The method and curriculum of education,
however, was a Western one. Since then, “international schools” have proliferated in KRI. The lan-
guage of instruction in these schools range from English, to French, to Dutch and so on. The cur-
ricula and pedagogy also follow the Western models. Research (Salih, Rahman, and Othman,
2017) found that these schools are not protecting the Kurdish language, as the mother language,
and that subjects that can introduce students to the culture and history of Kurdistan are down-
played. In other words, education that has long been thought as one of the main tools of social
integrations serves to further social de-integration and social marginalization.
Therefore, social integration of IDPs remains problematic as it is influenced by historical hostili-
ties, lack of institutional framework and overall absence of social integration as a policy concept
and tradition.
CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS POLICY INTERVENTIONS
Displacement of IDPs in KR is very likely to be a prolonged issue. Substantial numbers of IDPs,
especially from ERM backgrounds, tend to stay permanently or transitionally. The vast majority of
IDPs have settled in Kurdish neighbourhoods in the main cities of the region lacking necessary
tools and support to integrate in Kurdish society. One implication for such a reality is that there is
a need to develop social integration polices that go beyond the immediate and humanitarian needs
of IDPs to facilitate their social integration in Kurdish society. To this end, and by drawing on
SCT, social integration policies should assist and support hosting Kurdish communities and dis-
placed communities in establishing meaningful relationships and contacts.
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In spite of the fact that IDPs, whether in camp settings or in urban neighbourhoods, have not
had significant contacts with Kurdish communities, research (Khedir, 2017b and also Key infor-
mant interview) indicates that the social contact in Erbil, though remained to be infrequent, has
been helpful in the formation of a more positive image of Iraqi Arabs. Many research participants
reported that they had previously thought of Arabs as tribal, aggressive, enemies of Kurds and so
on, but that increased contact had changed their attitudes. A substantial number of respondents in
the same survey had mentioned that if they were able to speak Arabic language, they would have
had closer social relationships with Iraqi Arabs. While one cannot deny the impact of historical
injustices on inter-community relations in Iraq, it is important to note that availability of organiza-
tional support and well-designed policy interventions can steer communities towards more peaceful
relations.
It is also worth noting that although a pro-return preference tends to be prevailing, the intervie-
wees from KRG’s Ministry of Interior not only acknowledged a range of desired economic and cul-
tural outcomes of displacement (such as bringing in money into KRI especially by IDPs from
middle and upper classes and developing more understanding between communities), but also
advocated for taking displacement as an opportunity to build cross-community ties and peace-build-
ing initiatives.
This paper places emphasis on language support and diversification and heterogenization of
interaction spaces as two main elements of social integration policy. For Iraqi IDPs to be able to
establish a normal life, they first and foremost need to be provided with Kurdish language training
opportunities. To the best of author’s knowledge, apart from mandatory language trainings for Arab
surgeons who work in Kurdish cities5, there have been no such similar interventions. Kurdish resi-
dents often blame Arab IDPs who, after years of residence in KRI, still do not speak Kurdish lan-
guage. In fact, some Kurds tend to interpret it as an indicator of hostility and Arabs’ overall sense
of superiority and their belief that speaking Kurdish language is not a necessity. This is to suggest
that language, as is typically the case, transcends the day-to-day functions of communication and
carries many sensitive political connotations. In fact, access to language trainings is a challenge for
many, regardless of their nationality. Even people from Western countries, who for whatsoever rea-
son reside in Kurdistan, find it extremely difficult, if not totally impossible, to find suitable Kurdish
language courses. Perhaps Kurdish academic institutions and private sector can reach out to their
Western counterparts benefiting from their experience in designing tailor-made courses for the Iraqi
and Kurdish contexts.
Despite the overall acceptance that language competency is essential for any future social integra-
tion of migrants, refugees and IDPs, there are policy issues that remain contentious. Bian (2017)
summarizes the central debate in looking at language as a human right and language as a human
capital issue. By focusing on the first, Bian suggests European Union policies have promoted the
significance of multilingualism and the preservation of community and minority languages. Never-
theless, human mobility, access to job opportunities and inclusion of migrants require efficiency in
the formal language of the receiving countries, language as a human capital. Keeping the balance
between the two issues remains vital in the Kurdish context too. While KRG’s policies need to
approve and promote language differences as an individual and group human right and that it is
constitutionally endorsed anyways, it needs to develop policies that ensure that non-Kurdish speak-
ers will have access to language training opportunities. Moreover, the design and delivery of lan-
guage courses are also of pivotal significance: Caglitutuncigil (2018) warns that language classes
can have adverse effects as they may deepen gender and class-based inequalities. Thus, the author
calls for a more attention to the organizational features of those courses. In this respect, it has to be
made certain that language trainings will not cause gender lag (as it is more likely that men due to
their family status of being breadwinner in the Iraqi context) by admitting predominantly men in
these courses. In addition, language trainings should be extensive enough to enable trainees to work
in various employment settings, not only low paid jobs, as Caglitutuncigil (Ibid) contends.
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Moreover, language courses can be instrumental if they include the spoken language to allow IDPs
interact with ordinary Kurds in neighbourhoods and other residential settings.
What is more, diversification and heterogenization of interaction spaces, again systematically and
under right conditions, should be an element of the proposed social integration policy. Iraqi IDPs
in KRI are isolated either physically and socially in camp settings or socially in urban neighbour-
hoods. Rydgren, Sofi and Hallsten (2013, pp. 1679-1680) examined the impact of heterogeneous
settings (workplace, residential neighbourhoods, political parties and civil society) in Kirkuk and
concluded that heterogeneity of social settings increases the possibility of cross-community interac-
tion, which eventually produce inter-community trust and tolerance. With respect to IDPs in urban
settings in KRI, one can observe that heterogeneity has not penetrated most of the possible interac-
tion spaces. Apart from residential neighbourhoods, schools, workplaces (especially governmental
offices) and civil society tend to be much less heterogeneous. Schools that can gather large number
of students are more homogeneous than other interaction spaces. IDP children who headed to the
KRI before 2014 study the KRG’s school curricula in the Arabic language, and children who took
refuge in KRI after this date attend schools that are administratively run by Iraqi government (105
schools in Erbil alone), and they follow the Iraqi government school curricula in the Arabic lan-
guage (Interview with Mahmoud Hamza, Senior Education Facilitator, UNICEF). The Kurdish lan-
guage is not taught in any of those schools. The outcome is the isolation of IDP children socially
and stifling the development of their language skills and cultural competencies. This has been the
case for most Syrian refugee children in the last few years as they have continuously had their edu-
cation in the Arabic language. Though one can understand that such a situation has arisen because
of the massive nature of displacement and the limited admission capacity of Kurdish schools, the
outcome remains the same: that children from IDP and host communities lack the social space to
interact and to establish constructive relationships. Social integration policy has to develop strate-
gies to explore the ways through which multitude social spaces can be properly heterogenized. In
this regard, a special focus has to be placed on educational institutions. It is important to take max-
imum advantage of the fact that of 763,277 IDPs in KRI, 549,675 persons (72%) reside in non-
camp settings (JCCC, 2019). This means that the vast majority of IDPs share the physical sphere
with Kurds, the language proficiency training along with systematic increase in the interaction
spaces can offer greater chances for social integration of IDPs in KRI.
Finally, two issues are of fundamental importance: first, reluctance to return, for whatever reason,
cannot be sufficient to justify the need for social integration policies. However, for reasons stated
previously, stakeholders in the Iraqi government and the KRG are not in favour of looking at the
displacement as a long-standing and protracted concern. They intend the displacement period to be
short, and believe that social integration policies may prolong it. The author suggests that policy-
oriented research must begin by challenging this understanding. Second, social integration is
broader than the framework established in this article, social integration policies have to take into
account a complex range of political, legal, economic, cultural and attitudinal aspects and there are
many stakeholders who need to agree both in the design and in the implementation phases of these
policies. Nevertheless, the policy framework put forward in this article, invites policymakers to
consider the widely applied SCT as one of the routes of social integration. Barriers to integration
are many and diverse; however, for the SCT, language barriers and lack of social interaction spaces
constitute two major impediments.
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NOTES
1. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement define IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a
result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of
human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized
state border” (United Nations, 1998 cited in IOM Iraq, Feb. 2019)
2. Geographic distribution of violence in Iraq shows that Baghdad, Baqubah, Mosul, Samarra and Kirkuk have
been the most violent places in Iraq. RAND (cited in Hall and Stahl 2008) estimates the number of Iraqi
violence-related fatalities, excluding fatalities resulting from major military operations, between May 2003
and mid-January 2007 at 52,000 with 73 deaths per day in 2006. A larger household survey, for virtually
the same period, produced an estimate of 151,000 deaths (Green and Ward 2009, p. 610).
3. In a focus-group discussion, a group of Christian female IDPs told the author that the whole family of 5, 7,
9 and even 17 members live in one room, whereas previously, they owned houses in their AoO built on
200- and 300-m2 areas of land. It should be noted that Christian IDPs enjoyed relatively better services in
displacement compared with other IDPS for whom the situation, especially in the camp settings, was much
tougher.
4. Amirli is a town in Saladin governorate with a population of 42,000, mainly from Shi’s Turkmen ethnic
backgrounds.
5. This language training programme is a mandatory programme for Iraq Arab surgeons who work in KR. It
is a three-month length course with the aim of enabling surgeons to communicate with patients. So far, 400
surgeons have been covered by the course. In spite of its success as claimed by Mohammad Taha Hawez,
management director of Kurdistan Surgeons’ Syndicate (Phone Interview, 20 November, 2019) and the
demand of Arab surgeon for further training, it can be criticized on two grounds: first, the training is techni-
cal in the sense that the scope of it is limited to training surgeons to communicate with patients about their
physical problems only, and as such, no space is devoted to the use of language in everyday life. Thus, the
utility of these trainings is likely to stay in a narrow professional circle; and second, this training targets
general surgeons and dentists are not included in the programme.
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